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Judicial Review of the Aviation Hazard Determinations for Cape Wind:
Why The FAA Got It Wrong
Michael DeLoreto*
“Though human ingenuity may make various inventions…it will never devise any inventions
more beautiful, nor more simple, nor more to the point than Nature does.” – Leonardo Da Vinci 1
I.

Introduction
This paper examines the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Town of

Barnstable v. FAA 2 which stalled development of a major offshore wind farm project.
Harnessing the wind to power human activity started in early 500 A.D. when Persians
constructed the first known windmills.3 In 1854, the first known windmill that would spin in
whatever direction the wind blew and could automatically slow itself down was invented here in
the United States. 4 Americans have continued in the tradition of ingenuity to capture the power
of Nature, but with much greater efficiency and far more developed technology. 5 Over 51,000
megawatts of power is generated from wind in the United States today and our nation accounts
for twenty percent of the global generation of wind energy. 6 This number is expected to grow as
the United States embarks on an ambitious plan to provide 10 gigawatts of offshore wind
generating capacity by the year 2020 and 54 gigawatts by 2030. 7

* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Seton Hall University School of Law; M.P.A., University of Pennsylvania.; B.A., Drew
University. The author thanks his wife and family for their ongoing support and his faculty advisor, Professor Marc
Poirier, for his guidance during the writing process.
1
NOTEBOOKS OF LEONARD DA VINCI, XIV, (Jean Paul Richter ed., 1880).
2
659 F.3d 28, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
3
Phyllis Mckenzie, World History of Windmills, http://www.utexas.edu/gtc/assets/pdfs/windmills_world.pdf (last
visited Sept. 15, 2012).
4
Id. This technology was developed by Daniel Halladay of Connecticut. Id.
5
See generally Dennis G. Sheppard, Historical Development of the Windmill, NASA CONTRACTOR REPORT 4337
(1990), available at http://wind.nrel.gov/public/library/shepherd.pdf .
6
Industry Statistics, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, http://www.awea.org/learnabout/industry_stats/index.cfm (last
visited November 10, 2012). To put this power generation in perspective, one megawatt of wind energy is enough
to power at least 240 homes. FAQ, TRADE WIND ENERGY,
http://www.tradewindenergy.com/windlibrary_sub.aspx?id=136 (last visited October 12, 2012).
7
Press Release, Dep’t of the Interior, Salazar, Chus Announce Major Offshore Wind Initiatives, (Feb. 7, 2011),
available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Chu-Announce-Major-Offshore-Wind-Initiatives.cfm.
This initiative would produce enough power by 2020 for 2.8 million homes and 15.2 million homes by 2030. Id.
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The first of these major offshore wind projects in the United States was slated to be Cape
Wind, located off the coast of Massachusetts in Nantucket Sound. 8 Cape Wind is expected to
have 130 turbines located between five and thirteen miles from the Massachusetts shoreline. 9
This project can generate 174 megawatts of energy on average, with a maximum generating
capacity of 486 megawatts. 10 Cape Wind advocates claim that this wind farm will be able to
provide seventy-five percent of all the power needed for Cape Cod, Martha’s Vineyard, and
Nantucket. 11
Despite the push for green technology and the issuance of approvals from various federal
agencies including the Department of Interior (DOI) and Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), Cape Wind has met strong resistance from the surrounding local towns, the homeowners
in those communities, and even Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., the son of Robert F. Kennedy and a
Senior Attorney for the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). 12 In January 2011, the
Town of Barnstable, Massachusetts and the non-profit group The Alliance to Protect Nantucket

8

Project at a Glance, CAPE WIND,
http://www.capewind.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=Sections&file=index&req=viewarticle&artid=24&pag
e=1 (last visited September 10, 2012). This project was the first to be given a license by the Department of the
Interior, but there are other projects including a wind project off the coast of Atlantic City, NJ which may be
completed before Cape Wind due to the ongoing litigation which is the focus of this comment. See generally Press
Release, FISHERMEN’S ENERGY, Fishermen’s Energy Receives Final Construction Permit, (July 19, 2012)
http://www.fishermensenergy.com/press-releases/Press-Release%20Fishermen's-USACOE-Permits.pdf.
9
Frequently Asked Questions – Cape Wind Basics, CAPE WIND, http://www.capewind.org/FAQ-Category4Cape+Wind+Basics-Parent0-myfaq-yes.htm (last visited September 10, 2012).
10
Id.
11
Id. The entire area of Cape Cod, Martha’s Vineyard, and Nantucket used 230 megawatts of energy annually.
Press Release, CAPE WIND, Independent experts agree, Cape Wind electricity will power Cape & Islands and reduce
pollution and energy prices (June 3, 2003)
http://www.capewind.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=81&mode=thread&order=0&t
hold=0.
12
Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., An Ill Wind Off Cape Cod, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 16, 2005) available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/opinion/16kennedy.html ; Press Release, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, Secretary
Salazar Announces Approval of Cape Wind Energy Project on Outer Continental Shelf of Massachusetts (April 28,
2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/doinews/Secretary-Salazar-Announces-Approval-of-Cape-WindEnergy-Project-on-Outer-Continental-Shelf-off-Massachusetts.cfm; Determination of No Hazard to Air Navigation,
FED. AVIATION ADMIN. STUDY NO. 2009-WTE-332-OE (2010) available at
http://www.capecodtoday.com/downloads/capewind_dnh.pdf (hereinafter “Study No. 2009-WTE-332-OE”).
Further, the NRDC is a supporter of the project. See infra discussion and sources cited accompanying note 80.

2

Sound filed an action in the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit to stop the wind farm from
being constructed. 13 The petitioners argued that the FAA determination stating the wind turbines
did not pose a hazard to aviation was issued arbitrarily and capriciously. 14 Their reasoning was
the FAA “misread its own regulations, and . . . failed to calculate the dangers posed to local
aviation.” 15 Although the FAA opposed the relief sought, the D.C. Circuit vacated the FAA
decision and remanded the determination back to the FAA. 16 Taking the court’s opinion into
account, the FAA conducted a new inquiry and released a secondary determination still finding
that Cape Wind was not a hazard to air travel. 17
This comment will argue the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was arguably
justified in finding the FAA’s first determination to be arbitrary and capricious, and that based
upon the initial ruling, the FAA has not corrected the fatal flaw in its second determination. In
support of this thesis, Part II of the comment will give an overview of the approval process for
Cape Wind and explain the required FAA determination. Part III will explore the FAA’s initial
no hazard determination findings regarding Cape Wind. Part IV will summarize the arguments
made by the parties of the Barnstable case and will address the D.C. Circuit’s holding. Part V
will discuss why the FAA’s second determination is still deficient under the Barnstable holding.
Finally, Part VI will propose solutions to avoid future challenges to FAA No Hazard
Determinations, specifically including a revision to the FAA’s own regulations.

13

Town of Barnstable v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 659 F.3d 28, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 31, 36.
17
Determination of No Hazard to Air Navigation, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., STUDY NO. 2012-WTE-322-OE, (2012)
available at https://oeaaa.faa.gov/oeaaa/external/searchAction.jsp?action=displayOECase&oeCaseID=157246996
(hereinafter “Study No. 2012-WTE-322-OE”).
14

3

II.

Permitting Cape Wind and The Need for FAA Determinations
As the first proposed offshore wind project, Cape Wind entered uncharted statutory and

regulatory territory from its earliest stages. Cape Wind sought its first permit in 2001 from the
Army Corps of Engineers (“ the Corps”), which assumed authority under the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899 (“RHA”) to manage permitting for offshore wind energy projects, but without any
explicit statutory authority. 18
Section 10 of the RHA gave the Corps the ability to permit obstructions to navigable
waters of the United States. 19 The Outer Continental Shelf Land Act (“OCSLA”) expanded the
Corps authority to the Outer Continental Shelf. 20 While there was no authority under either
RHA or OCSLA for the Corps to grant leases for wind energy use on federal lands, in contrast,
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act did give authority for the DOI to license onshore
wind energy projects. 21 This discrepancy between licensing onshore and offshore wind projects
was addressed by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 which expressly granted the DOI—working in
cooperation with other federal agencies—to grant leases on the Outer Continental Shelf for
certain activities including wind energy production. 22 Subsequently, the DOI and the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) signed a Memorandum of Understanding confirming

18

33 U.S.C. §§ 407-468 (2012). Ann Yarling, Increasing Offshore Wind Projects: A Focus on Regulatory
Authority, (March 8, 2012) available at http://www.natlawreview.com/article/increasing-offshore-wind-projectsfocus-regulatory-authority.
19
33 U.S.C. §§ 407-468 (2012).
20
ADAM VANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40175, WIND ENERGY: OFFSHORE PERMITTING 4 (2012). The Outer
Continental Shelf extends from the U.S. coastline and outward for 200 nautical miles. Id. at 1.
21
43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2012); VANN supra note 20 at 3.
22
43 U.S.C. § 1337(p)(1) (2012); VANN supra note 20 at 4. Part of the reason for Congressional action on the issue
was the first lawsuit filed against Cape Wind which claimed the Corps of Engineers did not have the statutory
authority to license the Cape Wind project. See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 288
F.Supp. 2d 64 (D. Mass 2003), aff’d 398 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding Corps of Engineers did have authority
to issue permits).
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the exclusive jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior over renewable energy projects on the
Outer Continental Shelf. 23 By 2006, the Cape Wind project was under the authority of DOI.
While DOI maintained authority over the Cape Wind project per the Energy Policy Act
of 2005, the Act still required DOI to work in consultation with other federal agencies. 24 One
such agency was the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). 25 Congress specifically tasked the
Secretary of Transportation, who delegated this power to the FAA, to study any structures that
may interfere with air commerce. 26 Congress enumerated the specific factors considered when
studying a structure’s impact on air travel to be:
•

The impact on arrival, departure, and en route procedures for aircraft operating
under visual flight rules (VFR);

•

Impact on arrival, departure, and en route procedures for aircraft operating under
instrument flight rules (IFR);

•

The impact on existing public-use airports and aeronautical facilities; the impact
on planned public use airports and aeronautical facilities; and

•

The cumulative impact resulting from the proposed construction or alteration of a
structure when combined with the impact of other existing or proposed
structures. 27

Under this Congressional mandate, the FAA promulgated rules as to when a project
triggers a review for interference with air commerce. 28 These regulations state that when a

23

VANN supra note 20 at 5. DOI granted its authority to site offshore energy projects to one of its agencies, the
Mineral Management Service (MMS). Id. The MMS later became the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management,
Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEM) as part of a major reorganization within the Department of Interior following
the Deepwater Horizon explosion, commonly known as the BP Oil Spill. Press Release, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
Interior Department Completes Reorganization of the Former MMS, (Sept. 30, 2011) available at
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Interior-Department-Completes-Reorganization-of-the-Former-MMS.cfm.
24
See sources cited supra note 21 and accompanying text.
25
49 U.S.C. § 44718 (2012).
26
Id. While not the purpose of this comment, it is important to note that subdelegation, a subsequent delegation of
authority to an agency within a department, is permitted under 5 U.S.C. § 302.
27
49 U.S.C. §§ 44718(b)(1)(A)-(E) (2012).
28
Safe, Efficient Use, and Preservation of the Navigable Airspace, 14 C.F.R. § 77 (2012).
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structure’s height exceeds 200 feet the FAA must be notified. 29 In the case of Cape Wind, each
wind turbine tower will be 258 feet tall with the maximum height of each wind turbine blade
being 440 feet. 30 Because of the height of each turbine, Cape Wind was required to notify the
FAA of the project and thus the FAA began a determination of whether the turbines created a
hazard to air traffic.
A. The FAA Determination Process
To determine if a structure like the Cape Wind turbines will cause an impact on air travel,
the FAA regulations determine when an obstruction exists and how a study of that object should
be conducted. 31 The FAA rules state that an object is an obstruction if it is taller than 499 feet. 32
When the FAA conducts a study of an object that considered an obstruction, it seeks to
determine the impact:
•

For aircraft operating under VFR;

•

On aircraft operating under IFR;

•

On existing and planned public use airports; airport traffic capacity;

•

On obstacle clearance altitudes, approach procedures, and departure procedures;

•

On impacts on radar facilities, communications, and other surveillance systems;

•

The cumulative impact of the proposed structure when combined with all other
effects. 33

Based upon the findings of the study, the FAA will then make a determination as to
whether the obstruction will be a hazard to air navigation. 34 This determination will identify the
effects on air traffic departure and arrival; air traffic procedures; minimum flight altitudes; and
29

Construction or alteration requiring notice, 14 C.F.R § 77.9 (2012).
See sources cited supra note 8.
31
14 C.F.R. § § 77.13 through 77.35 (2012).
32
Obstruction standards, 14 C.F.R. § 77.17 (2012).
33
Evaluating aeronautical effect, 14 C.F.R. § 77.29(a)(1)-(7) (2012).
34
Determinations, 14 C.F.R. § 77.31 (2012).
30
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impacts on air navigation facilities, communications, and surveillance systems. 35 When there
will be a substantial aeronautical impact, the FAA will then issue a Determination of Hazard to
Air Navigation. 36 Conversely, when the study concludes “that the proposed construction or
alteration will exceed an obstruction standard but would not have a substantial aeronautical
impact to air navigation” or when no obstruction standard is exceeded, the FAA will issue a
Determination of No Hazard. 37 Although a Determination of No Hazard might be issued, the
determination may include conditional provisions, limits to minimize potential problems,
supplemental notices, or even marking and lighting requirements. 38
Once a determination has been made, the FAA provides an internal appeals process
called a Petition for Discretionary Review. 39 The intent of this review is so individuals who
were not given a prior opportunity can put forth substantive aeronautical comments related to the
proposal, such as alleged impacts on air travel and radar systems. 40 The Petition must include
“new information or facts not previously considered or presented during the aeronautical study,
including valid aeronautical reasons why the determination . . . made by the FAA should be
reviewed.” 41
To provide further internal guidance, the FAA issued Order JO 7400.2G (“the
Handbook”) which creates uniform procedures to be used in the administration of airspace
management. 42 The Handbook states that because the navigable airspace is a limited national
resource, “full consideration shall be given to all airspace users, to include national defense;
35

Id. at (b)(1)-(2).
Id. at (c).
37
Id. at (d)-(e).
38
Id. at (d)(1)-(4).
39
Petitions for Discretionary Review, 14 C.F.R. §§ 77.37 through 77.41 (2012).
40
14 C.F.R. § 77.37(a) (2012).
41
14 C.F.R. § 77.39(b) (2012).
42
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., PROCEDURES OF HANDLING AIRSPACE MATTERS, Order JO 7400.2G (April 10, 2008)
available at http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/7400.2G.pdf (hereafter cited as “Order JO
7400.2G”).
36

7

commercial and general aviation; and space operations. Accordingly, while a sincere effort shall
be made to negotiate equitable solutions to conflicts over the use of the airspace for non-aviation
purposes, preservation of the navigable airspace for aviation shall be the primary emphasis.” 43
Part Two of the Handbook supplements the statutory and regulatory framework Congress
and the FAA have established for addressing structures interfering with airspace. 44

When

conflicts in airspace use arise, the FAA emphasizes the need to protect airspace for air navigation
and protect air navigation facilities from either “electromagnetic or physical encroachments.”45
Should a proposed project and airspace use conflict, the Handbook again states first priority
should be given to altering the project. 46
Chapter Six of the Handbook details the process by which the aeronautical study required
by the FAA regulations is to be conducted and how to evaluate whether aeronautical impacts
exist.47 A structure has an adverse effect when it exceeds one of standards in the regulation,
including being of a height of over 499 feet or having a physical or electromagnetic impact on air
navigation facilities. 48 Other specifically enumerated adverse effects include:
a) Changes to an existing or planned IFR minimum flight altitude, a published or
special instrument procedure, or an IFR departure procedure for a public-use
airport;
b) Changes to a VFR operation, to change its regular flight course or altitude;
c) Restricting the clear view of runways, helipads, taxiways, or traffic patterns
from the airport traffic control tower cab;
d) Derogating airport capacity/efficiency;
43

Id. at 1-2-1 (emphasis added).
Id. at 5-1-1 (“The guidelines, procedures, and criteria detailed in this part supplement those contained in part 77,
Objects Affecting Navigable Airspace . . .”); 5-1-2 (“The FAA's authority to promote the safe and efficient use of
the navigable airspace, whether concerning existing or proposed structures, is predominantly derived from Title 49
U.S.C. Section 44718 . . .”)
45
Id. at 6-3-1(a).
46
Id. at 6-3-1(b).
47
Id. at 6-1-1 through 6-3-37.
48
Order JO 7400.2G at 6-3-3.
44
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e) Affecting future VFR and/or IFR operations as indicated by plans on file; or
f) Affecting the usable length of an existing or planned runway. 49
Although Section 6-3-3(b) states that an adverse effect exits when VFR operations are
impacted, Section 6-3-8(c)(1) states: “A structure would have an adverse effect upon VFR air
navigation if its height is greater than 500 feet above the surface at its site, and within 2 statute
miles of any regularly used VFR route.” 50 The Handbook also specifies that a structure could
cause a substantial impact through a combination of adverse effects, such as impacting both
flight courses and a significant volume of activity could be impacted. 51 The Handbook states
that the “significant volume” threshold is met if more than one flight a day would be impacted
since “this would indicate a regular and continuing activity.” 52
III.

The FAA Initial Determination of No Hazard
Under the framework of 49 U.S.C. 44718, 14 C.F.R 77, and the Handbook, the FAA

conducted an aeronautical study on the Cape Wind project. 53 The study:
considered and analyzed the impact on existing and proposed arrival, departure, and
en route procedures for aircraft operating under both visual flight rules and instrument
flight rules; the impact on all existing and planned public-use airports, military
airports and aeronautical facilities; and the cumulative impact resulting from the
studied structure when combined with the impact of other existing or proposed
structures. The study disclosed that the described structure would have no substantial
adverse effect on air navigation. 54
As part of the Determination of No Hazard process, the FAA circulated the proposal on
February 13, 2009 to “all known aviation interests and to non-aeronautical interests that may be
49

Id at 6-3-3(a)-(f). VFR Rules allow the pilot to be able to operate the aircraft based upon his visual reference with
the ground and surroundings while IFR Rules are in effect when the pilot cannot operate the aircraft based on visual
references due to weather or darkness and must rely solely on instruments to navigate. See Redhead v. U.S., 686
F.2d 178, 180 at n.1 (3d Cir. 1982).
50
Id. at 6-3-8(c)(1).
51
Id. at 6-3-5.
52
Id. 6-3-4.
53
Study No. 2009-WTE-332-OE, at 2.
54
Id. (emphasis added).
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affected by the proposal.” 55 It allowed one year for interested persons to review the study and
comment, with the period for comment extended from an original deadline of March 22, 2009 to
April 30, 2010. 56 Fourteen letters of objection were filed with the FAA, and their comments
with FAA responses made up a more than fifty percent of the Determination of No Hazard
document issued on May 17, 2010. 57 Some of the comments filed with the FAA were outside
the scope the aeronautical study such as commenter concerns on the environmental noise impacts
of the wind farm on the mainland and that the type of wind turbine used was improper. 58 There
were, however, two areas of concern for the commenters that did fall under the FAA purview:
the impact on flights operating under VFR and the impact on air traffic control radar. 59
A. VFR Flight Concerns
Public comments against Cape Wind first focused on the adverse impacts to VFR
navigation. 60

Many commenters expressed concern that a considerable number of VFR

operations would be impacted because many pilots would move from lower altitudes of 500 to
1000 feet to altitudes of 1000 feet or higher in order to avoid the turbines. 61 Additionally,
Nantucket Sound is subject to poor weather, which may create navigation issues for VFR pilots
who may need to stay at certain altitudes to maintain visual observation. 62 The FAA did not
agree with the commenter’s concerns; it stated that the “proposed wind turbines [did] not exceed
any 14 C.F.R. Part 77 obstruction standards.” 63 The FAA did state however that “some aircraft

55

Id. at 4.
Id.
57
See sources cited supra note 53.
58
Id. at 4-5.
59
Study No. 2009-WTE-332-OE, at 5.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. (alteration from original). 14 C.F.R. § 77 requires a height of 499 feet or higher to be an obstruction. See
sources cited supra notes 26-28 and discussion.
56
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operating under visual flight rules (VFR) may have to alter their altitude or route of flight.”64
The FAA further noted that the Cape Wind project is within two statute miles of a regularly used
VFR route. 65 The FAA however determined that the project would not adversely impact VFR
operations because Section 6-3-8(c)(1) of the Handbook states that the structure has to be above
500 feet tall and within two statute miles of a VFR route. 66 In the Determination, the FAA did
not address Section 6-3-3(b) which states a structure has an adverse impact when it requires “a
VFR operation, to change its regular flight course or altitude.” 67 The FAA went on to note that
the wind mill structures would be marked and/or lighted to make them “conspicuous to airmen
should circumnavigation be necessary.” 68
B. Impact on Radar Facilities
Most commenters took issue with the impacts on the three radar facilities which provide
for the detection of aircraft in the Nantucket Sound area. 69

The FAA agreed with the

commenters that Cape Wind could cause “unwanted search radar targets,” known as “clutter” to
appear on an air traffic controller’s radar screens. 70 The FAA found the impact on the Otis Air
Force Base (FMH) radar to be particularly significant because that Base uses a type of analog
search radar system which has “limited capabilities to resolve the effects of clutter caused by

64

Study No. 2009-WTE-332-OE, at 7 (emphasis added).
Id. A statute mile is the standard mile of 5,280 feet. This is compared to a nautical mile which is roughly 1.15
statute miles. Conversion Table For Nautical Miles and Statute Miles, NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY (2012), http://msi.nga.mil/MSISiteContent/StaticFiles/NAV_PUBS/DBP/endtables.pdf.
66
Id.
67
Id. See sources cited supra note 49 and accompanying text.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 5. The three radar facilities are North Truro Cape (QEA), Nantucket (ACK), and Otis Air Force Base
(FMH). Id.
70
Study No. 2009-WTE-332-OE, at 5. The FAA reached this conclusion after conducting its own study as well as
reviewing the studies provided by certain commenters. Id. As a technical matter, radar works by sending out a
signal which then hits an object and is returned to the radar station showing an object on the radar screen. Clutter is
the term used to describe returns caused by surface objects (ground and sea objects caused by nature), volume
(commonly caused by weather), and point sources (windmills, tall buildings, and other objects not caused by
nature). See generally RADAR TUTORIAL, http://www.radartutorial.eu/11.coherent/co04.en.html (last visited
January 4, 2013).
65
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multiple wind turbines within a confined area.” 71 The cumulative effect of the wind turbines’
rotation on the FMH radar system would be expected to reduce search radar detection for aircraft
at all altitudes above the wind farm. 72 To address this problem, the FAA determined that
upgrades to the radar systems would be necessary, and Cape Wind agreed to pay $15 million into
an escrow account for the FAA to make the modifications or install a new radar system should
the upgrades not work. 73 With this agreement in place, the FAA concluded “there [would] not
be a significant adverse effect to radar services in Nantucket Sound.” 74
C. Petition for Discretionary Review
Taking all the cumulative impacts of the Cape Wind project into account, the FAA did
not consider the project to have a “substantial adverse effect” when it issued the Determination
of No Hazard. 75 As previously noted, the FAA has an internal appeals mechanism to allow those
in disagreement with the decision to petition for discretionary review. 76

Various persons

opposed to Cape Wind filed a Petition for Discretionary Review which the FAA accepted as
procedurally valid. 77

The FAA later rejected the request for discretionary review on the

substantive basis that the wind turbines did not exceed 500 feet in height, thus there was no

71

Study No. 2009-WTE-332-OE at 6. Although the FAA determination refers to Otis Air Force Base, the facility is
actually an Air National Guard and Coast Guard facility located on Cape Cod and is home to the 102nd Intelligence
Wing, a non-airborne military intelligence unit. 102ND INTELLIGENCE WING http://www.102iw.ang.af.mil/ (last
visited November 5, 2012).
72
Study No. 2009-WTE-332-OE at 6.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 7.
76
See sources cited supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
77
Brief for Petitioner at 23, Town of Barnstable v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 659 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 101276).
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adverse effect on VFR operations. 78 The rejection also stated that because the FAA mitigated
the impacts on radar system disruption, there was no cumulative impact. 79
IV.

Town of Barnstable v. FAA and D.C. Circuit Holding’s Impact
On January 19, 2011, the Town of Barnstable and the Alliance to Protect Nantucket

Sound brought suit in the D.C. Circuit against the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).80
The Town of Barnstable asserted it was harmed by the FAA No Hazard Determination because it
is the operator of the Barnstable Municipal Airport (HYA) and also has an eight mile coastline
along Nantucket Sound. 81

HYA is the third busiest airport in the State of Massachusetts with

108,657 flights occurring in 2009. 82 Of those flights, 84,593 occurred under VFR as compared
to 24,064 which occurred under IFR. 83 The Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound (APNS) is a
501(c)(3) tax exempt organization “supported by thousands of private donors including aviators,
concerned citizens, towns and local government and civic groups, trade associations, historic
preservation interest and associations of fishing interest and boaters that oppose industrialization
of Nantucket Sound and use the site of [Cape Wind] to pursue their interests.” 84 Their claim of
harm was that their commercial, environmental, and recreational interest at and around the wind
farm site would be detrimentally impacted. 85

78

Brief for Respondent at 12, Town of Barnstable v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 659 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir 2011) (No. 11276).
79
Id.
80
Brief for Petitioner at 1.
81
Id. at 22.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 11.
85
Id. at 11-12. As an aside, the opposition is a prime example of NIMBY (Not In My Backyard). These NIMBY
concepts are listed in a Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., op-ed where he states the views from sixteen historical lighthouses
will be damaged and he urges visitors to come see the historic wrecks off Cape Cod, the fishing villages, and try
some of the amazing seafood the region offers. See source cited supra note 12 and discussion. There is also a
connection between APNS and a fossil fuel tycoon, William Koch, who has donated over $1.5 million to APNS and
sits on the APNS Board of Directors. Bill Koch: The Dirty Money Behind Cape Wind Opposition, GREENPEACE,
(2012) http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/en/campaigns/global-warming-and-energy/polluterwatch/Bill-Koch/. While
APNS claims to be concerned with the environmental impacts, major environmental special interest groups support

13

A. Petitioner and Respondent Briefs
The first argument raised in both the petitioners and FAA briefs was the issue of whether
the parties even had standing to bring the suit. 86 The Town of Barnstable argued for standing to
challenge the FAA determination on the grounds it would be harmed as the owner/operator of
HYA. 87

For an organization like APNS to have standing, however, it must show that its

members would have standing, the interests at stake are relevant to the purpose of the
organization, and neither the claim nor the relief sought requires individual participation. 88
APNS used an affidavit of its President in order to establish the harm to aviation, economic
livelihood, and recreational activities, to establish standing as an organization. 89
The FAA disputed the standing of the parties, in particular APNS. To establish standing
under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, a plaintiff must show the “threat of suffering injury in
fact that is concrete and particularized; the threat must be actual and imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; it must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and it must be
likely that a favorable judicial decision will prevent or redress the injury.” 90 The FAA asserted
that there was not only no threat of immediate harm from Cape Wind, but the FAA had no ability
to stop the building of the project—only the Department of the Interior did—therefore the FAA
determination cannot be traceable to their injury. 91 In support of this premise, the FAA noted the
decision to move forward with the project was made by the Department of the Interior on April

the project including the Sierra Club, Greenpeace, Clean Water Action, League of Conservation Voters, Natural
Resources Defense Council, and the National Wildlife Federation. Support for Cape Wind, CAPE WIND (2012)
http://www.capewind.org/article47.htm.
86
See generally Petitioners’ Brief at 5-7, 26; Respondent’s Brief at 17. Although not the focus of this comment, a
brief discussion on standing is necessary in order to better understand the parties’ position and the court holding.
87
Petitioner’s Brief at 26.
88
See Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000).
89
Id. See also Affidavit of Audra Parker, Addendum to Petitioners’ Brief at ¶¶ 5-7.
90
Respondent Brief at 17 (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555U.S. 488, 493 (2009)).
91
Id. at 18 (citing BFI Waste Sys. Of N. Am., Inc. v. FAA, 293 F.3d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
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28, 2010 but that the FAA Determination of No Hazard was not released until May 10, 2010.92
Therefore, the FAA claimed it really had no control over the final issuance of permits for Cape
Wind, only the Department of the Interior did. 93
Aside from standing, the true issue in dispute was the question of whether the FAA
properly followed its own substantive standards. APNS and the Town’s argument rested on the
premise that the FAA violated its “statutory duties and its own regulations” because the FAA’s
sole focus in its Determination of No Hazard was whether the wind turbines met the technical
definition of obstruction, without taking into account the interference with air navigation. 94
Petitioners stated that Congress charged the FAA with the statutory authority to determine
whether a structure has an impact on air travel depending upon the factors listed in 49 U.S.C.
44718(b). 95 Under this authority, the FAA promulgated the regulations found in 14 C.F.R. 77
and issued the Handbook to provide internal guidance on how to determine when a structure is
an obstruction, either by size or by creating a substantially adverse aeronautical effect. 96 The
Town and APNS asserted that the FAA’s issuance of a Determination of No Hazard was
arbitrary and capricious because the decision did not comport with what the Handbook
prescribed. 97 In other words, the FAA failed to follow its own guidance.
The Handbook instructs that the first priority of the FAA is the protection of airspace and
that altering the proposal should be the first priority in the case of conflicts. 98 The Handbook
goes on to state that an adverse effect exists when there is an obstruction standard violation under
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Id. at 21.
Id.
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Petitioners’ Brief at 16.
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Order 7400.2G at 1-2-1. Petitioners’ Brief at 18.
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14 C.F.R. 77 and/or an impact on air navigation facilities. 99 This existed here because there was
an impact on radar facilities. 100 In addition, because the FAA found that there would have to be
changes to certain aircraft operating under VFR, petitioners assert this meant there was an
adverse impact under 6-3-3(b). 101 Moreover, since the FAA found that some VFR aircraft would
be impacted, this could be a combination of impacts under 6-3-5. 102 Lastly, petitioners pointed to
a provision in the Handbook which states that if there is evidence of a structure being a hazard,
the FAA has no discretion to find otherwise. 103
The FAA disputed the petitioners’ view and claimed it met their statutory and regulatory
obligations. First, the FAA stated that the statutory and regulatory authority tells the FAA when
to conduct an aeronautical study and what should be taken into account as a part of that study. 104
The FAA claimed it did exactly that and where the statute fell silent, it filled in the gaps with the
regulations and Handbook.

105

Therefore, the FAA claimed it should be owed Chevron

deference because Congress told them to conduct the study, leaving how to use and apply the
findings of the study up to the FAA. 106
Second, the FAA claimed it followed prior court precedent and its decision in Cape Wind
was generally consistent with prior determinations it had made. The FAA noted that agency
interpretations of its own regulations are controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation. 107 The D.C. Circuit held on a prior occasion that the FAA should also issue a
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finding of a hazard when the structure exceeded the 14 C.F.R. 77 standards or had an effect on
local air navigation facilities.108

Because the FAA claimed it also took into account and

answered all the comments and issued raised during the public comment period, the FAA
asserted it met its obligations to adequately explain its results and respond to relevant and
significant public comments. 109
B. Overview of the Court Opinion
On October 28, 2011, the D.C. Circuit decided Barnstable, holding that the petitioners
had standing and that the FAA determination was vacated and remanded. Even though the court
agreed that the FAA determination has no “enforceable legal effect” and cannot prevent the
building of Cape Wind, it found that the Department of Interior (DOI) gave the FAA a
significant role in the decision making process when it mandated that construction could not
begin until the receipt of the FAA hazard determination and compliance with any mitigation
measures. 110 This reliance by the DOI on the FAA created a redressability issue because it
would be “improbable” that the FAA’s determination would be “blithely disregarded.” 111
On the substantive matter of the No Hazard Determination, the court held the
determination was indeed arbitrary and capricious because the FAA departed from the
Handbook. 112 The court based this reasoning off the varying definitions of “substantial adverse
effect” which existed throughout the Handbook. For example, substantial adverse impact is
defined in 6-3-3 of the Handbook as existing when there is an obstruction standard violation
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D&F Alfonso Realty Trust v. Garvey, 216 F.3d 1191, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
Public Citizen, Inc. v. FAA, 988 F.2d 186, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1993)(citing Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC 567 F.2d
9, 35 & FN 58 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
110
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Id. at 34.
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under 14 C.F.R. 77 or when there is an effect on the operations of the air traffic system. 113 In
section 6-3-4 of the Handbook, substantial impact exists when there is an adverse impact on a
significant number of flight operations, and Section 6-3-5 states there could be a substantial
adverse effect if there is a cumulative impact under Sections 6-3-3 and 6-3-4. 114 Yet in the view
of the FAA, all these prior definitions are seemingly irrelevant because of Section 6-3-8(c)(1),
which states that there can be a substantial adverse impact on VFR routes when an object is over
500 feet tall and is within two miles of a VFR route. 115 Because the FAA put its sole reliance on
the definition of substantial adverse impact under Section 6-3-8(c)(1) without addressing the
other issues raised in Sections 6-3-3, 6-3-4, and 6-3-5, the court held the FAA was “improperly
relying . . . on 6-3-8(c)(1)” and it “failed to supply any apparent analysis of the record evidence
concerning the wind farm’s potentially adverse effects on VFR operations.” 116
C. The Barnstable Holding’s View on Agency Deference
The D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Barnstable greatest impact was in the area of the amount of
deference an agency can expect with regard to interpreting its own rules. 117 Agency regulations
are promulgated under the authority of a statutory mandate and are generally reviewable for the
procedural requirements of notice and comment and their substantive requirements. 118 However,
agency interpretations of their own rules, such as the FAA’s interpretation of substantial adverse
effect, are generally given greater deference unless the interpretation is plainly erroneous or
113

Id. at 35.
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116
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inconsistent with the regulation. 119 In the Administrative Procedures Act, which sets forth the
standard of judicial review governing federal agency decisions in the absence of an explicit
provisions of the enabling act, decisions can be set aside as “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” 120 Most court decisions note that this
deference is not controlling, rather it can be overcome by the judiciary when it strongly feels
there is a lack of a rational connection between the facts and the policies enacted. 121
Because Barnstable turns on the FAA’s interpretation of its Handbook and its regulations
in promulgating the hazard determinations, the court’s level of review should be deferential
unless the FAA decision was completely misguided. Auer v. Robbins is the leading case in this
area. 122 In Auer, police sergeants and a lieutenant in the St. Louis Police Department sued under
the Fair Labor Standards Act claiming they were owed overtime pay. 123 The City of St. Louis
argued the officers were exempt from overtime pay as executive level personnel. 124

The

Department of Labor had previously issued regulations stating that the overtime exemption
applied to employees paid a specified minimum amount on a salary basis, which required that the
compensation “not [be] subject to reduction because of variations in the quality or quantity of the
work performed.” 125 Even though the St. Louis Police Manual stated that the officers’ pay could
be reduced for disciplinary actions, the Department of Labor interpreted its own regulation
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excluding reductions in salary for reasons such as disciplinary measures. 126 In a unanimous
decision written by Justice Scalia, the Court upheld the Department of Labor’s interpretation of
this “salary basis test” for overtime because the standard was created by the Department and
therefore its interpretation should be left to the agency unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulations. 127
This trend towards deference can be found in other cases. In a different Supreme Court
decision, the Court held that when the analysis of the documents requires a high degree of
technical expertise, courts should defer to the informed discretion of the responsible agency. 128
Notwithstanding, courts do not blindly defer to an agency without carefully reviewing the record
to ensure the agency has made a reasoned decision based on the information. 129 The D.C.
Circuit has also acknowledged that substantial deference is owed to agencies in interpreting their
own regualtions. In Breneman v. FAA 130, a structure being built on a hill would extend 62 feet
into the airport’s approach surface. 131 The FAA determined the structure to be a hazard based
upon an earlier version of the Handbook and the court upheld that determination because the
evidence, in the court’s view, was sufficient to support the decision. 132
Based upon these cases, it seems plausible that the issuance of the Cape Wind No Hazard
Determination and the explanations contained within should be sufficient to survive judicial
126
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review. Just like in Auer, 133 the FAA was using an interpretation of its Handbook in order to
make a decision about whether Cape Wind was a hazard to air traffic. The FAA was also
making a determination about air traffic in the Cape Wind area that required some type of
technical expertise, thereby allowing the court to defer to the informed discretion of the agency
as was the case in Marsh 134 and Breneman 135. Unfortunately for the FAA, the D.C. Circuit
required more of a connection between the determination and every aspect of the Handbook that
addresses the definition of a substantially adverse situation. The court’s reliance on D&F Afonso
Realty illustrates this point. 136
In D&F, a home was built near a small privately owned airport, thus requiring the FAA
to be notified because of the proximity between the residence and the airport. 137 The FAA
determined the home intruded the “transitional surface” 138 airspace around the airport by 16.1
feet. 139 The FAA conducted an aeronautical study under 14 C.F.R. 77 and determined the house
would cause a substantial adverse effect on the airport and inbound flights operating under
VFR. 140 The Massachusetts Aeronautics Commission followed the FAA’s determination and the
town refused to issue an Occupant Certificate for the house. 141 The hazard determination was
challenged in the D.C. Circuit, and the court held that the decision to find the house a hazard was
arbitrary, capricious, and not in accord with the law. 142 The court reached this conclusion by
finding that the FAA did not properly follow its guidelines entitled “Procedures for Handling
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Airspace Matters.” 143 Specifically, while the court did find the house violated the transitional
surface around the airport, there was no link between the hazard determination and the hazard
standard. 144 Moreover, there were other structures like trees which also impeded the transitional
surface, yet the FAA failed to take that into account. 145 The court succinctly stated, “[e]ven our
highly deferential standard of review requires more than the FAA offers. Thus, the FAA’s
abandonment of its own established procedures and its lack of reasoned analysis on the record
constitute arbitrary and capricious agency action in violation of the law.” 146
V.

The FAA Determination on Remand Is Still Deficient Under Barnstable
In response to the D.C. Circuit decision in Barnstable, the FAA conducted a new hazard

determination for the Cape Wind project including a new study and new public comment
period. 147 On August 15, 2012, the FAA issued a second Determination of No Hazard for the
Cape Wind project. 148 This latest determination attempts to address the holding the D.C. Circuit
expressed in Barnstable by rewriting how it reached used its own guidelines to determine if a
structure will have a substantial adverse impact. 149 The FAA stated in this new Determination
that its first step was to determine if a violation of 14 C.F.R. 77 exists.150 If so, then it must
proceed to the second step of evaluating whether there was an adverse effect. 151 If an adverse
effect is found, then the structure will be found to be a hazard. 152 In this new Determination, the
FAA explicitly clarified that there is no violation of 14 C.F.R. 77 and therefore no hazard to air
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navigation. 153 The FAA made this decision because the project is below the 499 foot threshold,
and the FAA installed upgraded radar equipment to address the “clutter” issue found in the first
determination. 154 Therefore, the FAA claimed there is no need to analyze the project using the
Handbook Section 6-3-3, which is one of the sections addressing substantial adverse effects. 155
The FAA also reasserted there is no reason to analyze the issue under 6-3-8(c)(1) because this
only applies if both the criteria of 500 feet in height and two miles within a VFR lane exist. 156
While Cape Wind is within two miles of a VFR lane, the wind farm does not exceed the height
requirement of 500 feet. 157
Although a slightly improved explanation, the August 2012 Determination of No Hazard
has already been challenged by the Town of Barnstable and APNS in the D.C. Circuit and will
likely be vacated and remanded again by that court. 158 The FAA is attempting to lead the court
away from the conflicting definitions of substantial adverse impact that exist in the Handbook,
but this maneuver is unlikely to pass muster. 159 The statutory authority under which the FAA
operates requires the study of any structure that could impact the enumerated factors listed in the
statute. 160 Moreover, the obstruction standards under 14 C.F.R. 77, which the FAA states are not
violated, are only one piece of the puzzle, as there are other regulatory provisions which may be
violated. 161 These provisions have become implicated because despite the FAA claiming it need
not perform a study, the FAA did in fact gather data on VFR traffic to “respond to the court’s
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concern raised in [Barnstable].” 162 As part of this data collection contained in the newest No
Hazard Determination, the FAA stated that “some aircraft under VFR may have to alter their
altitude or route of flight.” 163 In fact, the study concluded that that for a nine month period
between January and September 2011, there were 427 aircraft operating below 949 feet, which
would be in violation of 14 C.F.R. 91.119 should the wind farm be in place. 164 The study also
stated that fifty two percent of VFR aircraft operations occurred over the southeast corner of the
wind farm area. 165
As the D.C. Circuit noted in Barnstable, the provisions in the Handbook identify multiple
ways a structure can cause an adverse effect, especially for VFR traffic. 166 The idea that a
structure has to be above a certain height and within a certain distance in order to cause an
adverse effect, as 14 C.F.R. 77 or Section 6-3-8(c)(1) prescribes, “simply identifies one
circumstance . . . potentially one among many.” 167 Despite the FAA’s insistence that Section 63-3 is not implicated and that it is again solely relying on 6-3-8(c)(1), it seems unlikely the D.C.
Circuit will backtrack and look favorably on this No Hazard Determination. The FAA did not
address Handbook Section 6-3-3, and it also failed to discuss 6-3-4 which the Court observed can
also cause an adverse impact when more than one aeronautical operation a day would be
affected. 168
The FAA also did not discuss two other Sections of the Handbook which the Court
expressly mentioned in its opinion. These are Handbook Section 6-3-5 169 and Section 6-3-8(b),
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which states that “any structure that would interfere with a significant volume of low altitude
flights by actually excluding or restricting VFR operations in a specific area would have a
substantial adverse effect and may be considered a hazard to air navigation.” 170 Considering the
data the FAA provided that showed at least one flight per day could be impacted, it seems
unlikely the court will agree that the second No Hazard Determination was proper. 171
VI.

The Need For a Revised FAA Handbook
In Barnstable, D&F, and Breneman, the core issue the courts ultimately addressed was

whether the FAA followed its own guidelines contained in the Handbook for when structural
interference exists. The first of these cases, D&F, was decided in 2000, so the conflict the
Handbook causes is not new by any means. But the application of the Handbook to wind farm
development is a novel issue, especially as the growth of the wind energy sector continues in the
United States.

Wind farms become more cost effective when they are located closer to

population centers 172, therefore conflicts related to when a structure poses a hazard will become
more prevalent. 173
Some recent scholarship has suggested that the United States should enact comprehensive
legislative reforms for siting wind farms. 174 The problem with these worthy solutions is one of
pragmatism; Congress lacks the necessary political will and cohesion in order to act on such
170
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matters. While the topic of wind farms seems mundane to the average observer, the politics
surrounding alternative energies is complicated due to government support for companies like
Solyndra who have gone bankrupt even after generous tax breaks and government stimulus
dollars. 175 With Congress’ inability to solve even the most immediate problems facing the
country, coupled with other pressing issues on the national agenda, legislation on alternative
energy is unlikely to occur.
Another commentator has also recommended that agencies involved in the permitting and
siting of wind farms become more aware of the opposition to these projects and conduct more
thorough analyses and thus better explanations. 176 However, this fails to recognize the fact that
FAA, as with other federal agencies, is facing a greater demand on its services without the
corresponding increase in funding; thus, the FAA is doing more with much less. 177 While the
FAA’s role in siting wind farms is certainly important, it is understandable that the FAA may not
be put the level of effort some want into this area considering the FAA’s other obligations such
as air traffic control, airplane and airline regulation, and air travel technology development. 178
Because Congress is unlikely to act and the FAA has few resources to tackle this issue,
the FAA must find a cheap and independent method of remedying this problem for Cape Wind
and future wind farm projects. The only viable solution is for the FAA to modify its own
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Handbook to make it friendlier for the agency to use and the court to interpret. By taking this
small step, it will reduce its costs and burdens in the long term for the FAA. 179 Specifically, the
FAA should modify Chapter 6 of the Handbook in order to make the procedures for airspace
management more streamlined. A proposal would be to turn Sections 6-3-3, 6-3-4, and 6-3-5
into one new Section. 180 This new section could read:
6-3-3 Substantial Adverse Impact
For a structure to have a substantial adverse impact, it must first exceed an
obstruction standard under 14 C.F.R. 77.17. If this exists, then there must also be
at least one of the following conditions met for a substantial adverse impact to be
found:
a. Requires a change to an existing or planned IFR minimum flight
altitude, a published or special instrument procedure, or an IFR
departure procedure for a public-use airport.
b. Requires a VFR operation to change its regular flight course or
altitude. This does not apply to VFR military training route (VR)
operations conducted under part 137, or operations conducted under a
waiver or exemption to the CFR.
c. Restricts the clear view of runways, helipads, taxiways, or traffic
patterns from the airport traffic control tower cab.
d. Derogates airport capacity/efficiency by impacting at least one
aeronautical operation per day.
e. Affects future VFR and/or IFR operations as indicated by plans on file.
f. Affects the usable length of an existing or planned runway.
g. Causes interference with the operation of air navigation or
communication equipment.
This revised Section 6-3-3 makes clear when the provisions of 6-3-3 are supposed to
apply. It removes the confusing “and/or” language contained in the current version and it also
179
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clarifies the current provisions of 6-3-4 and 6-3-5 by including them in 6-3-3 so as to keep all the
substantial adverse effect language under one section.

Such a change will make court

interpretation easier and improve the efficiency of FAA determinations. 181
If the FAA Handbook contained the above language, it is possible the determination on
Cape Wind would not have been overturned. Cape Wind never would have triggered this
“substantial adverse effect” language based upon the fact it did not exceed the standards in 14
C.F.R. 77.17. 182 The only reason the “substantial adverse impact” argument can be used by the
opponents of Cape Wind is because the current version of the Handbook does not define
substantial adverse impact as needing the pre-requisite violation of 14 C.F.R. 77.17.

The

proposed language removes their main argument, addresses the problems specified by the D.C.
Circuit in Barnstable 183, and curtails the likely argument of future anti-wind farm advocates.
VII.

Conclusion

The Cape Wind project is an example of the problems that face wind energy development
project in the United States. 184 Not only are their political implications from nearby residents
and other special interest groups, 185 but a host of regulatory challenges which wind farm
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route, thus Cape Wind does not trigger this Section. Order 7400.2G at 6-3-8(c)(1).
182
For a discussion on 14 C.F.R. § 77.17 see supra note 32.
183
See supra notes 110 through 116 and discussion contained therein.
184
Not all wind mills face opposition. For example, Atlantic City, NJ hosts five, 380 foot, wind mills directly on the
bay and has found that the wind mills have not only increased tourism, but home values with views of the wind mills
has increased faster than those without the view. Molly Golubcow, Tourism that Blows, ATLANTIC CITY WEEKLY
(Jan. 26, 2006), http://www.atlanticcityweekly.com/arts-and-entertainment/features/tourism_that_blows50733287.html.
185
In addition to concerns noted supra at notes 12, 85 and 175 Congress has also gotten involved. On August 8,
2012, Congressman Darrell Issa (R-CA), Chairman of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, wrote
a letter to President Obama suggesting the President’s support for wind energy programs created political pressures
on the FAA to approve the project. Letter from Congressman Darrell Issa to President Barak Obama (August 8,
2012) at 4 available at http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Chairman-Issa-to-President-Obama8-8-12.pdf. Further evidence of the polarized nature of Cape Wind can be found in a letter from APNS President
Audra Parker to the FAA suggests the FAA succumbed “to political pressure with suboptimal decisions leading to
serious public safety risks.” Letter from Audra Parker to FAA Acting Administrator Michael Huerta (May 22,
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proponents may not even consider including the obtainment of FAA approvals due to the height
and other aeronautical issues associated with wind turbines.
As more wind farms projects are proposed, challenges to their construction will occur
more frequently. The FAA will continually be placed in the position of determining whether
these projects have an adverse effect on air traffic. While the benefits and pitfalls of wind energy
may be at the core of many challenges, it is the role of the judiciary not to consider those issues,
but whether the FAA properly issued its determinations. 186 In the case of Cape Wind, the D.C.
Circuit was justified in its holding that the FAA did not properly follow its own Handbook in
determining whether the wind turbines would cause an adverse impact to air traffic. Because the
FAA failed to appropriately address those issues in its most recent Determination of No Hazard,
the latest challenge to Cape Wind will likely be successful, thus delaying the project even
further. The FAA should learn from this experience and make the changes this comment
suggests to its Handbook. Doing so would be prudent, so as to not impede worthy wind farm
projects, but also to reduce agency costs as resources become scarcer. Wind farms development
is here and the FAA cannot rely on Congress or the judiciary to rescue it from its regulatory
obligations; it must fix its own problems from the inside.

2012) at 12 available at
http://www.saveoursound.org/userfiles/files/APNS%2BLetter%2Bto%2BFAA%2Bre%2BFOIA%2B5%2B22%2B1
2%5B1%5D.pdf.
186
The D.C. Circuit did note that “while of course the wind farm may be one of those projects which such
overwhelming policy benefits (and political support) as to trump all other considerations, even as they relate to
safety, the record expresses no such proposition.” Town of Barnstable, 659 F.2d at 33.
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